Abstract:
One of the important issues in the philosophy of ethics and the philosophy of law is the acceptance or rejection of the intrinsic nature of good and evil and its impact on legislation. This article, using a descriptive-analytical method, examines this issue from the perspective of David Ross's intuitionist school. Ross, by accepting the self-evident nature of good and evil for certain moral concepts like 'good' and 'right' under the category of "prima facie duties," relies on the "intuitive induction" of a person who has reached sufficient intellectual maturity. In cases of conflict between two duties, he considers the duty that is right given the totality of circumstances as the 'actual duty.' By relying solely on this personal, non-generalizable intuitive induction and neglecting matters such as the relationship between good/evil and real interests/harms (maṣāliḥ wa mafāsid), humanity's lack of comprehensive knowledge of all interests and harms, and the role of revelation in completing the explanation of this relationship, Ross fails to correctly grasp the foundation of moral concepts on objective realities or provide a logical solution for resolving conflicts of intuitions. Regarding the acceptability of law, he discusses the motive for obedience to law based on principles of gratitude, fidelity, and beneficence. However, overall, due to issues such as inattention to the role of revelation, lack of clarity in the criterion for intellectual maturity, ambiguity regarding the role of the threefold duties in legal obedience, the impossibility of prioritizing between intuitions, relativism, and the possibility of punishment without prior declaration (ʿiqāb bilā bayān), his ethical school cannot serve as a basis for legislation.